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9Partners in Prevention Task Force: Statement of Principles 
September 2012
A growing number of transnational threats to our physical and economic securi-
ty — from nuclear proliferation to arms and narcotics trafficking — overwhelm 
the know-how, capacity, and jurisdiction of any single government. In particular, 
global supply chains have become key enablers for a range of illicit activities. By 
undermining security and legitimate business, these illicit activities harm both the 
public and private sectors. More effectively mitigating these threats while opening 
new economic opportunities requires a multilayered approach that better integrates 
the expertise and decentralized market-driven mechanisms of the private sector, 
and that fully leverages non-regulatory tools as first recourse. This approach should 
be guided by the following principles:
Public-private collaborations must be responsive to market characteristics and 
security gaps. Even when modeled on past successes, static, formulaic approaches 
will not keep pace with today’s economic and security dynamics. The key to mutu-
ally beneficial collaboration is a flexible process and incentive structure that satisfies 
the economic concerns of industry and the regulatory concerns of government. 
Market forces, in themselves, are not a panacea. Respect for proprietary business 
operations and the profit motive must be balanced with sufficient transparency for 
oversight in service of security challenges.
Information sharing must be an ongoing priority. Properly calibrating the roles 
and responsibilities of government and private sector actors depends on an insti-
tutionalized information-sharing framework that benefits both constituencies. 
Moreover, when effective public-private collaborations already exist, new initiatives 
should strengthen and complement them rather than duplicating effort.
Security and profitability can be mutually reinforcing goals. Companies can 
maintain existing market advantages and unlock new opportunities by improving 
security within their organizations and respective industries, and by contributing to 
the security and resilience of the wider global trading and financial systems.
Foreword
In September 2012, the Partners in Prevention Task Force was convened at the 
Stimson Center for its first plenary meeting. To capture the impetus for the 
project and the big-picture ideas that would guide our work, we developed and 
unanimously adopted a “Statement of Principles,” reproduced here in full:
            FOREWORD
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 
COMPETITIVENESS GO HAND IN 
HAND AND ARE INCREASINGLY 
GLOBAL IN SCOPE.
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The path from those principles to the findings and recommendations that we 
present in this report was instructive and rewarding. Task Force members and 
staff from the Center’s Managing Across Boundaries Initiative collaborated over 
18 months with hundreds of industry partners. Most of this outreach was con-
centrated among high-tech manufacturers and service providers, transport and 
logistics firms, and insurance providers. The two-part goal of these dialogues 
was to turn our founding principles into concrete recommendations that indi-
vidually were actionable and that collectively were diverse.
The goal to offer actionable ideas led us to approach key issues largely, though not 
exclusively, through the lens of US exports. Particularly since the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, the US government has devoted significant attention and 
resources to regimes for screening and safeguarding imports, and to the protection 
of infrastructure that is critical for the nation’s trade. Those goals remain priori-
ties. But we must realize that rising interdependence between the US and global 
economies means that what happens at our borders, and within them, is only part 
of the story. Security and economic competitiveness go hand in hand and are in-
creasingly global in scope. Public-private partnerships therefore must align secu-
rity imperatives with market dynamics more innovatively to be sustainable. The 
greatest opportunity to advance this mutually beneficial approach today lies at the 
intersection of traditional security concerns and the interests of the US exporting 
community — what we call the “export nexus.” 
The goal to offer diverse ideas, in part, reflected a necessary humility. There is 
no silver bullet that can protect the nation against the full range of cross-border 
illicit trafficking threats or thwart all proliferation efforts. To the contrary, just as 
we must broaden our perspective on how market dynamics figure in achieving 
genuine security, we must dramatically expand the set of public-private tools we 
are willing and able to use. We had no illusions that we could construct this full 
“portfolio.” Rather, our aim was to demonstrate more succinctly the need for, 
and the potential of, modernized partnerships across several key variables:
• Relevant national security mission areas. Mission areas that our 
recommendations address include combating terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of intellec-
tual property and other sensitive private sector information, border 
management, counter-intelligence, port security, and the resilience of 
critical infrastructure.
• Operating context and functional requirements. Our recommenda-
tions highlight public-private dynamics in both steady-state environ-
ments and contingency scenarios. A related but distinct consideration 
is the precise capabilities required in any given context.
• Nature of public-private interactions. The solutions we advocate 
reflect varied degrees of regular, direct engagement between govern-
ment and industry. Some call for frequent and close collaboration on 
a very particular problem of common interest. Some call for coop-
erative mechanisms that can be employed as needed. And some call 
for non-regulatory frameworks that enable coordination of a more 
decentralized nature or a largely industry-led effort. 
Given this goal, the variety among Task Force members was a great asset. Al-
though they served, of course, in their individual capacities, they represented an 
impressively wide range of specialties, outlooks and professional backgrounds. 
Some have spent their entire careers in the private sector, while others have held 
senior positions in government. It has been a pleasure working with each of 
them, and we are grateful for their time and valuable insights.
While traditional government countermeasures will remain crucial for US 
security, they no longer suffice. Complementary mechanisms that leverage the 
resources, agility and expertise of the private sector are essential — and not just 
for “security,” narrowly understood. They also will go far in shaping the future 
of US global influence and leadership. We urge stakeholders in both industry 
and government to take these ideas, work with Stimson and the other organiza-
tions willing to confront the challenges of implementation head-on, and act. 
Jay Cohen (RADM, USN, Ret)  Barry Blechman 
Task Force Chair    Task Force Vice Chair
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Executive Summary
A global economy has empowered criminals and terrorists on a global scale. 
Embedded across worldwide production, trade and investment networks, illic-
it trafficking in high-tech data and equipment, narcotics, arms and counterfeit 
goods has laid bare the weaknesses of top-down government controls. Without 
bold changes, both public and private interests are likely to suffer a growing toll 
from this insidious and intermingling array of threats, including the especially 
grave threat of nuclear proliferation.
We must meet today’s rapidly evolving security challenges with a more integrat-
ed, proactive, network-like response. In particular, we must better leverage the 
agility, resources and expertise of the private sector. Diminishing government 
resources add even greater urgency to this imperative. 
This is an opportune moment for action, particularly where security issues 
intersect with US exports. President Obama’s February 2014 executive order 
on streamlining export/import processes has added momentum to a range of 
trade-facilitation efforts, such as the impressive work by industry participants in 
US Customs and Border Protection’s Advisory Committee on Commercial Op-
erations. Recent international developments are poised to serve as “force multi-
pliers” as these efforts advance further down the path to implementation.
Traditional law and regulation will remain the pillars for security. But those 
pillars must now be reinforced with more agile, non-regulatory approaches to 
counteract cross-border illicit networks more systemically. Market-based incen-
tives will be key to ensuring that this “new normal” in public-private partner-
ships is genuinely sustainable. 
By appealing to three interrelated prerequisites for enhanced partnerships — 
enabling stakeholder engagement, modernizing risk management and lever-
aging value-added information — we offer a range of pragmatic action items 
for advancing security and economic competitiveness. Some are directed at 
government, some are directed at industry and some call for a collaborative 
approach. We recommend: 
• Rewarding “trusted exporters” of sensitive goods and technologies
• Empowering logistics service providers to increase “return on 
investment” for both government and industry
ILLICIT TRAFFICKING... 
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• Modernizing the information-sharing toolkit for trade transparency 
and risk management
• Promoting layered port security through the SAFETY Act and Resil-
ience STAR Program
• Developing a public-private “playbook” for resilient trade flows
• Extending the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act and considering 
future changes
• Fully implementing the International Trade Data System
Each of these ideas, if implemented, would bring meaningful change. Together, 
they would go far in building the broader portfolio of tools we urgently need for 
modernized public-private security cooperation.
The Challenge and the Imperative for Change
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The Challenge and the Imperative for Change
“… the inclination to equate control with safety gives 
 a false sense of security.”
Beyond “Fortress America”: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World 
National Research Council Committee on Science, Security and Prosperity
The Blended Threats of Illicit Trafficking
When Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) successfully conveyed printer 
cartridges laced with explosives onto two express delivery aircraft in October 2010 
— only to be stymied at the eleventh hour thanks to an intelligence tip — there 
was good reason for a frenzied response. But in a break with usual practice, gov-
ernment agencies chose to collaborate with industry to bridge the information 
gaps that the incident had exposed. Through a process of “co-creation,” regulators 
and representatives of the major integrated express delivery companies developed 
the concept for what became the Air Cargo Advance Screening Program.
Under the new program, express delivery companies are required to transmit 
only the most crucial shipment information on an expedited timeline, with less 
stringent parameters. As a result, companies are able to transmit the information 
to US security officials much earlier than under the old rules. The companies 
even have provided government with access to their proprietary systems in order 
to improve the targeting process. In short, the program advances the public 
interest through more timely and effective security targeting of cargo, and the 
private interest through a reduced regulatory burden.
In many other cases, the US government has not modernized its approach. We 
should not wait for a near-tragedy before we act.
Illicit trade in weapons, narcotics, counterfeit goods and much more has found 
many seams where even the most well-resourced law enforcement and intelli-
gence efforts do not suffice. These threats are thriving on contemporary avail-
ability of sophisticated technologies and know-how, as well as a lack of transpar-
ency in some aspects of the international shipping system. They are taking root 
in, and spreading through, the same global physical and informational infra-
WE SHOULD NOT WAIT 
FOR A NEAR-TRAGEDY 
BEFORE WE ACT.
            THE CHALLENGE AND THE IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE
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structure that powers legitimate trade and communication. We are especially 
concerned by trafficking in dual-use goods and technologies, such as those that 
could support a nuclear weapons capability. 
Traditional law and regulation are, and will remain, the pillars for security. But 
globalization mandates that those pillars now be reinforced with more agile, 
non-regulatory approaches to counteract cross-border illicit networks more sys-
temically. The precise circumstances and objectives will often differ, so we need 
to develop a portfolio of tools. Market-based incentives will be key to ensuring 
that this “new normal” in public-private partnerships is genuinely sustainable.
Our Solutions: Three Prerequisites for Modernizing 
Public-Private Security Cooperation 
Dialogue with hundreds of industry partners over 18 months has left us con-
fident that both government and industry have within their reach pragmatic, 
actionable steps that can make a meaningful difference. At a broad level, three 
interrelated themes emerged from these discussions, representing three strategic 
prerequisites for building out the public-private toolkit for addressing 21st-cen-
tury proliferation and illicit trafficking challenges. In developing our ideas with 
industry partners, one of the principal criteria we followed was ensuring that 
each recommendation significantly addressed at least one of these prerequisites. 
Modernizing Risk Management
• Realigning government and industry assumptions of risk to better reflect 
their respective capabilities, resources and interests — and thereby enhanc-
ing efficiency and effectiveness
• Forging more integrated decision-making and operational capacities 
among government and industry actors
• Identifying market-based incentives that can change industry behavior 
meaningfully and sustainably
Leveraging Value-Added Information
 • Achieving greater clarity on regulatory regimes and enforcement practices 
 • Establishing information-sharing mechanisms that enable richer analytics
Enabling Stakeholder Engagement
• Involving a broader set of private sector stakeholders for a more informed 
view of how security imperatives interact with market dynamics, both 
across and within industry sectors 
• Creating a regulatory environment that promotes innovation in the service 












Leveraging “Market Power” in Public-Private Partnerships The Full Spectrum of Industry Value Drivers: A Simplified View
The Challenge And The Imperative For Change
























Making Public-Private Security Cooperation More Efficient, Effective and Sustainable
Task Force Findings
• Global commerce is stretching traditional tools of governance to their 
limits — and beyond. Global economic integration has opened oppor-
tunities for billions of people, but it has also empowered criminals and 
terrorists on a global scale. Embedded across worldwide production, trade 
and investment networks, illicit trafficking in high-tech data and equip-
ment, narcotics, arms and counterfeit goods has laid bare the weaknesses 
of top-down regulatory, intelligence and enforcement tools. Without bold 
changes, both public and private interests are likely to suffer a growing toll 
from this insidious and intermingling array of threats, including the espe-
cially grave threat of nuclear proliferation.
• A fluid and complex threat environment demands a diverse “portfolio” 
of public-private solutions. We must meet today’s rapidly evolving securi-
ty challenges with a more integrated, proactive, network-like response. In 
particular, we must leverage the agility, resources and expertise of the pri-
vate sector. While government will never act at the speed of 21st-century 
innovation and commerce, it must be prepared to employ a broader array 
of legal, policy and institutional tools to enable this approach.
• A modernized approach to public-private engagements can — and 
must — advance both public security and economic competitiveness. 
Public-private partnerships are much more likely to be sustainable and 
effective when they meet three interrelated prerequisites.
• Modernizing Risk Management. Beneath widespread support for the gen-
eral idea of public-private partnerships is a distressingly poor under-
standing of how different approaches are needed for different objec-
tives and different circumstances. Government must more aggressively 
explore the potential of market-based incentives to change industry 
behavior meaningfully and sustainably. That does not mean handouts 
to industry. To the contrary, it means aligning security strategies with 
industry value drivers in sustainable fashion, allowing a greater “re-
turn on investment” for all.
• Leveraging Value-Added Information. Industry and government both 
could derive substantial value beyond the status quo by sharing data 
and other information related to the security and regulatory environ-
            TASK FORCE FINDINGS
BUT IT HAS ALSO EMPOWERED
CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS 
ON A GLOBAL SCALE.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION HAS OPENED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILLIONS OF PEOPLE,
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ments. The challenge is to precisely identify the informational needs 
of both parties and the proper modalities to meet those needs.
• Enabling Stakeholder Engagement. Public-private mechanisms such as the 
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council must better reflect 
the complexities of the modern economy — both in the issues they 
address and in the stakeholders they include. Government must find the 
institutional means to engage more effectively with stakeholders beyond 
the 16 identified “critical infrastructure” sectors, including small busi-
nesses, third-party logistics providers (particularly those active in US ex-
port transactions), and those individuals whose lobbying status currently 
precludes them from sharing their expertise in relatively transparent fora. 
Public-private cooperation also should better promote industry inno-
vation in the service of security priorities. Under current approaches, 
process often weighs down genuine problem solving.
• Look to the “export nexus.” Senior US government leaders recognize 
that more innovative approaches are crucial for addressing cross-border 
security challenges and the equally urgent task of adapting to a restrictive 
budgetary environment. But this is an especially opportune moment to act, 
in particular where security issues intersect with US exports.
• President Obama’s February 2014 executive order on streamlining 
export/import processes1 has added momentum to a range of trade-fa-
cilitation efforts, such as the impressive work by industry participants 
in US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Advisory Committee 
on Commercial Operations (COAC).2
• Recent international developments can serve as “force multipliers” 
as these efforts advance further down the path to implementation. 
Examples include the Trade Facilitation Agreement that was part of 
the World Trade Organization’s December 2013 “Bali Package,” as 
well as the Mutual Recognition Arrangements that harmonize the US 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism with the comparable 
regimes of foreign trading partners.
• The National Export Initiative (NEI) has entered a new phase with 
“NEI/NEXT,” and a determined leadership at the Commerce De-
partment is adding new ideas and new energy to the government-in-
dustry conversation. 
• A major initiative to reform export controls is pivoting to a special 
focus on dual-use goods and technologies — those that have both 
commercial and military (or proliferation) applications. Here again, 
the Commerce Department is playing a central role.
Many important steps to promote synergies between security and competitiveness 
do not require major new authorities — especially if senior executive branch offi-
cials leverage relevant interagency tools. Close coordination between the Depart-
ments of Commerce and Homeland Security will be especially important. 
• Modest institutional innovations can enable government-industry 
security cooperation to flourish where historically it has faltered 
or never been attempted. In particular, third-party vehicles devel-
oped and operated by industry or public-interest organizations, in 
coordination with government as appropriate, have strong potential. 
In many cases, trade associations and private standards-development 
organizations can play a crucial facilitation role. In some cases, other 
organizations are needed to dedicate time and resources, provide sub-
ject matter expertise, or convene disparate stakeholder groups. 
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Recommendations
Reward “Trusted Exporters” of Sensitive Goods and Technologies
The US exporting community remains subject to a complex maze of legal and 
regulatory requirements. But to address threats such as illicit transshipment in an 
increasingly global marketplace, government must find ways to complement tra-
ditional oversight and enforcement mechanisms with decentralized, market-em-
bedded incentives for enhanced diligence. This layered approach would more 
systemically discourage and impede illicit, careless, and otherwise problematic 
industry activities in global value chains.
One important example can be seen in the regimes affecting US exporters of 
goods and technologies controlled under the Export Administration Regulations. 
When contemplating enforcement actions against one of these exporters, the US 
government expressly takes into account the strength of the company’s internal 
compliance program. A similar approach in assessing company applications for 
export licenses could unlock substantial dual benefits. A properly crafted incen-
tives regime for “compliance-plus” company programs would enable government 
to target oversight resources more efficiently and identify problematic transactions 
more consistently. At the same time, it would raise the general level of diligence 
throughout the exporting community by rewarding those companies that volun-
tarily adopted more rigorous processes in key functional areas, such as end-user 
evaluation (sometimes called “know your customer” due diligence).
The Export Administration Regulations and “Dual-Use” Items
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR 730-799) often are 
characterized as regulating exports and reexports of US-origin dual-use items 
— goods and technologies that have both civilian and military (or prolifera-
tion) applications. In fact, items subject to the EAR also include some purely 
civilian items and some items that are used exclusively for military applications 
but that do not warrant control under the International Traffic in Arms Reg-
ulations. Of these, the Task Force is concerned principally with the challenges 
posed by trade in dual-use items, which generally is more susceptible to the 
smuggling and misinformation tactics of illicit traffickers.
            RECOMMENDATIONS
THE US EXPORTING 
COMMUNITY REMAINS 
SUBJECT TO A COMPLEX 
MAZE OF LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS.
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The administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative will soon turn its focus 
from military items to dual-use goods and technologies. The Commerce Depart-
ment and other administration officials already have indicated plans for a com-
prehensive review of the Export Administration Regulations. The time to act on 
common-sense solutions that advance both public and private interests has arrived.
Findings
• The White House and the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State 
have demonstrated laudable collaboration and persistence in the first phase 
of the Export Control Reform Initiative. The next phase of the initiative is 
a critical opportunity to move beyond list reform and more fundamentally 
modernize risk management of sensitive goods and technologies, particu-
larly to better address the growing risks of illicit transshipment and unau-
thorized end-use. Leveraging industry expertise and resources must be a 
central part of any such effort. 
Recommendations for Government and Industry
• As a priority, the Department of Commerce, in consultation with the 
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and State, should work with 
industry to develop and pilot a “trusted exporter” regime (“the regime”). 
Under the regime, US exporters of dual-use items could voluntarily opt to 
qualify for broader licenses/authorizations upon adequately demonstrating 
adherence to a government-recognized set of best practices, developed by 
industry, for enhanced diligence in compliance and licensing. Exporter 
procedures for end-user evaluation should be a core part of the regime.
• Participating companies should be subject to external procedural au-
dits on a periodic basis to verify compliance. The regime should stipu-
late assessment of specific remediation measures if such audits identify 
a major infraction for which insufficient implementation of the agreed 
practices is shown to be the primary cause.
• The pilot test of the regime should include select exporters of at least 
three significantly different categories of controlled items. It also 
should avoid arbitrary timelines in order to ensure the regime can be 
properly tested and modified as needed.
• The Commerce Department should consider how coordinating the pro-
posed regime with existing regimes could improve efficiency and effec-
tiveness for all stakeholders. Existing regimes worth consideration in this 
regard include License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization, Authori-
zation Validated End-User and the Special Comprehensive License. 
• The Commerce Department and CBP should facilitate further cooper-
ation on relevant issues among three of the advisory committees under 
their sponsorship: from the Commerce Department, the President’s Export 
Council Subcommittee on Export Administration (PECSEA) and the 
Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC); 
and from CBP, the COAC. 
Recommendations for Industry
• Industry specialists in export controls, from a diverse set of companies, 
should endorse a set of cross-sector best practices for end-user evaluation. 
Best-practice guidance in other key functional areas, such as training and 
the administration of “deemed exports,” also would be valuable.  
• Participating industry specialists should communicate closely with the 
Commerce Department to ensure the industry-developed guidance can 
gain appropriate government recognition to serve as the regime’s underly-
ing benchmarks. They likewise should consult with CBP to ensure align-
ment with CBP’s Trusted Trader Program.
• The exporting community should support a formal standards development 
process in partnership with an organization accredited by the American Na-
tional Standards Institute. Including the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology or another US government entity in the process should be strongly 
considered. While such a process would be time-consuming, it could promote 
broader and more consistent adoption of the voluntary best practices.
2928
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Empower Logistics Service Providers to Increase 
“Return on Investment” for Both Government and Industry
Logistics service providers (LSPs) play a critical role in contemporary global 
trade. They serve as the connective tissue among disparate legal jurisdictions, 
geographic locales and client business models. But this wide reach, along with 
the diverse services LSPs provide, means many regulatory regimes and trade-fa-
cilitation initiatives do not reflect LSP business models in their full complexi-
ty. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, for instance, has yet to 
include the full range of LSPs that operate in US foreign commerce.  
benefit substantially from the risk management expertise and cost advan-
tages that highly reputable LSPs provide. Top-tier LSPs could likewise 
benefit from a regime that recognizes the security and efficiency gains they 
bring to international trade.  
• In establishing its new Trusted Trader Program, CBP took a laudable first 
step by aiming to streamline the requirements and associated benefits for the 
Importer Self-Assessment and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Ter-
rorism — and thus building a stronger link between compliance and supply 
chain security. Collaboration with LSPs would offer many opportunities to 
strengthen that link further.
Recommendations for Government and Industry
• CBP and LSPs should begin a collaboration to develop a voluntary “trusted 
trader” regime for LSPs (“the regime”). 
• The regime should align with and leverage relevant international instru-
ments, including but not limited to: 
• the World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework 
• Mutual Recognition Arrangements that harmonize the US Cus-
toms-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism with comparable regimes of 
foreign trading partners 
• the Trade Facilitation Agreement included in the World Trade Orga-
nization’s December 2013 “Bali Package”
• the April 2013 ICC Guidelines for Cross-Border Traders in Goods issued 
by the International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Customs 
and Trade Facilitation
• the anticipated WCO international guidelines on customs-trade part-
nerships
• Stakeholders should build on the lessons developed in relevant govern-
ment-industry dialogues previously, including but not limited to the BIS 
“Small and medium sized enterprises in particular need assistance with 
 application procedures and development of robust compliance programs.”
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness 
Recommendations for a 21st Century Technology Control Regime, January 2010
In a 2013 survey, 77% of LSPs cited risks connected to US export 
regulations as a reason for losing business.
Source: Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of Customs 
and Border Protection (COAC), 2013 Export Survey, November 2013
“Logistics Service Provider”
For purposes of this report, logistics service provider is a generic term the 
Task Force has stipulated to encompass all variants of non-asset-based and 
limited-asset-based transport providers. In US foreign and domestic com-
merce, such entities include: Indirect Air Carriers (IACs), also known as 
air freight forwarders; Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carriers (NVOC-
Cs); ocean freight forwarders; surface forwarders; and property brokers. 
These references are not meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. While the 
Task Force sought to be inclusive, the third-party logistics sector is highly 
diverse and often varies from country to country.
This has security implications on two levels. First, LSPs sometimes can evade 
scrutiny in facilitating illicit trade, knowingly or otherwise. Second, govern-
ment and industry alike are missing an opportunity to leverage, through positive 
incentives, the unique position and expertise of LSPs for a greater “return on 
investment” — that is, for better security outcomes and more profitable trade.
But both government and industry have expressed interest in finding a way to 
seize that opportunity. Among a set of seven best practices it has published for 
exporters/reexporters, the Department of Commerce recommends using LSPs 
that adhere to similar compliance and due diligence practices.3 Industry feedback 
on an earlier draft of that document reflected a strong preference for a “trusted 
network” or certification program for LSPs.4
Findings
• LSPs must figure prominently in efforts to develop a set of next-generation 
“trusted trader” regimes, particularly for US exports. To leverage mar-
ket-based incentives effectively, it is vital that such regimes remain volun-
tary and reflect input from both the exporting community and LSPs as to 
what specific benefits could elicit their participation on a sustainable basis.
• With properly recalibrated compliance and liability burdens, a number of 
US businesses — especially small and medium sized enterprises — could 
3130
RecommendationsMaking Public-Private Security Cooperation More Efficient, Effective and Sustainable
Modernize the Information-Sharing Toolkit 
for Trade Transparency and Risk Management
As government and the expert community confront the challenge of adapt-
ing security strategies for an era of global proliferation and criminal networks, 
industry confronts its own challenges — many of them competitive, but many 
others regulatory. Multiple layers of export controls and sanctions often leave 
even the best-intentioned, law-abiding company wondering whether its inter-
nal compliance measures are sufficient. In many cases, such ambivalence leads 
companies to forego business opportunities they would have acted on in a less 
ambiguous regulatory environment.
For the law-abiding company, in other words, enforcement of export controls and 
sanctions affects not only compliance practices, but also its more fundamental as-
sessments of risk and return. The clarity and consistency with which government 
regulators articulate and apply enforcement policies have an indirect but substan-
tial impact on economic competitiveness. Recent efforts by some of the relevant 
agencies to revise their respective enforcement guidelines, and to better coordinate 
those guidelines with one another, are important but insufficient steps.  
Similar dynamics undermine communication and information sharing on a 
host of other related topics. One example arises when a US exporter receives a 
suspect inquiry from an unknown foreign company seeking to procure prolif-
eration-sensitive items. Government has various tip lines, outreach programs 
and other mechanisms to communicate with industry on such matters.9 But US 
exporters often are not aware of these mechanisms, or elect not to use them.
Findings
• There is substantial potential for both government and industry to benefit 
from a diverse set of new or enhanced information-sharing tools. Whether 
the context is public-private, public-public or private-private interaction, 
such tools can advance government and industry interests through improved 
“In the absence of support and clarity in how the lines are drawn, [small and 
medium sized enterprises] are reluctant to export and assume an inordinate 
amount of risk and liability. All exporters periodically receive information 
from prospective buyers that could be of importance to U.S. enforcement and 
intelligence authorities. The adversarial nature of our system makes sharing 
that information difficult.”
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness 
Recommendations for a 21st Century Technology Control Regime, January 2010
‘Best Practices’ for Industry to Guard Against Unlawful Diversion through Trans-
shipment Trade5  and the Freight Forwarder Guidance published by the Depart-
ment of Commerce.6
Recommendations for Government
• The Border Interagency Executive Council (BIEC), newly codified and 
empowered by a recent executive order, should ensure that all agencies 
with significant roles in US exports actively participate in the collabora-
tion.7 Since many export-related regulatory and enforcement authorities 
reside outside CBP, this broader set of government participants is crucial to 
identifying sufficient benefits for LSPs to view the regime as viable.
• In parallel with the government-industry collaboration for LSPs, the 
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security should update 
its guidance on routed export transactions, beyond the February 2014 
Proposed Rule that focuses largely on definitional issues.8 Further guidance 
is needed to address the major differences in LSP operational practices, as 
well as how those practices sometimes differ across modes for a given LSP.  
Recommendations for Industry
• LSPs should actively share their views on private sector benefits they would 
like to see emerge as part of the government-industry collaboration.
• To enhance understanding of the varied roles played by LSPs, firms and 
trade associations should continue to support the current Department of 
Commerce training for export-focused CBP officers on issues related to 
the Export Control Reform Initiative. 
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clarity on regulatory regimes and enforcement practices, richer analytics to 
support risk management in both government and industry, and enhance-
ments to trade transparency more generally. 
• Many agencies have established mechanisms for communicating with the 
private sector, but government officials tend to overestimate the breadth 
of industry feedback they receive. Industry reluctance to use these mech-
anisms owes principally to liability concerns, confusion regarding some-
times duplicative or vaguely defined tools, and the absence of a clear 
business case for such engagement.
Recommendations for Government and Industry
• The Department of Commerce and major trade associations should jointly 
develop a framework of technical and procedural options for two-way infor-
mation sharing on issues related to trade, innovation and technology trans-
fer.10  The framework could begin simply, with publication of a consolidated 
“menu” of such options available under the existing authorities of interested 
agencies. In time, it might also serve as a vehicle to create new mechanisms 
better suited for specific unmet needs. Recommended applications include:
• Government feedback on industry inquiries related to compliance and 
enforcement11
• Industry provision to government of information on foreign entities 
making suspect purchase inquiries or engaging in other anomalous 
behaviors, and government dissemination of relevant analysis
• Exchange of best practices between industry and the Export Enforcement 
Coordination Center (E2C2) for developing trendline data on illicit trans-
shipment, along with shared access to associated data repositories
• Government provision of properly sanitized intelligence to industry 
stakeholders that support interdictions of suspected contraband
• Identifying how the Open Data Policy12 and the Open Data 
Cross-Agency Priority Goal13 can better harness government-wide 
data assets to support trade transparency and improve supply chain 
performance, much like a recent executive order aims to do with 
respect to climate change14
• Industry provision of subject matter expertise and analytics capabilities 
in developing updates to the Intelligence Community Assessment of 
Threats to the Global Supply Chain System, first completed in 2012
• Industry support to the Program Manager for the Information Sharing 
Environment (PM-ISE) for relevant milestones under the PM-ISE’s 
December 2013 implementation plan15
Recommendations for Industry
• Industry should establish benchmarking mechanisms for peers to share best 
practices in protecting against illicit transshipment and other misappropria-
tions of sensitive technologies.
• Should informal benchmarking exercises show particular value, indus-
try should consider extending this work to establish a codified set of best 
practices. Industry also should consider pursuing collaboration with various 
third parties, including external security experts, civil society stakeholders 
and standards development organizations.
• Industry should support research on how best to manage legal risks asso-
ciated with the options included in the proposed framework of informa-
tion-sharing mechanisms, as well as development of practical guidance on 
issues such as constructing nondisclosure agreements. Industry also should 
support further research on how technological and regulatory trends might 
demand further institutional innovations over the longer term.16
• Exporters, supply chain and transport firms and insurance providers should 
assess the potential of third-party information-sharing vehicles to mitigate 
compliance risk and more generally promote secure, transparent and effi-
cient operations. Stakeholders in the cybersecurity domain have begun to 
explore this institutional option; it should be examined for possible use in 
other domains. Such a capability could take many forms, and participating 
firms could elect to use it in tandem with or in lieu of a related public-pri-
vate mechanism. As one example, the third-party entity could securely 
receive information from participating firms related to sensitive transac-
tions; analyze the information in aggregate; and share with participating 
firms value-added insights that could be adapted for their individual risk 
management processes.17
• Technology providers should work with participating companies to fashion a 
technology platform with the capabilities desired for sanitizing the informa-
tion submitted, performing analytics and providing related decision support.
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The SAFETY Act, administered by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), is intended to foster investment in anti-terrorism technology and en-
hance critical infrastructure security. The Act provides specific liability pro-
tections to qualifying technology innovators and standards developers. The 
Resilience STAR Program, modeled on the widely known ENERGY STAR 
certification system, aims to promote critical infrastructure resilience by rec-
ognizing owners and operators that have met specific, industry-defined perfor-
mance targets. Also administered by DHS, Resilience STAR was first intro-
duced in the home construction sector, but the White House has publicly stated 
a goal of expanding it into the transportation sector.18
Findings
A surge in construction and related modernization efforts at US ports presents an 
opportunity for broad adoption of enhanced security practices and new operation-
al efficiencies. It is a good opportunity particularly to achieve the White House 
goal of expanding the Resilience STAR Program into the transportation sector. 
Recommendations for Government
• To reinforce its efforts to establish layered port security standards, DHS 
should consider Block Designation of SAFETY Act protections for private 
sector leaders in standards development for security at multimodal ports.
• DHS also should consider expanding the Resilience STAR Program to 
include transportation stakeholders with adequately demonstrated compe-
tencies in port security and business continuity.
US seaports are in the midst of at least $46 billion in infrastructure 
upgrades planned over the 2012-2016 period.
Source: American Association of Port Authorities 
US Port Infrastructure Investment Survey, 2012-2016, May 2012
Promote Layered Port Security through the SAFETY Act 
and Resilience STAR Program
Seaports worldwide are in the midst of change. Expansion of the Panama Canal 
and other developments in maritime commerce are prompting many ports to 
make major investments in their basic infrastructure, information technology 
systems and intermodal facilities. These widespread construction and modern-
ization efforts are an opportunity to promote existing best practices for security, 
and perhaps to incentivize new ones, while also promoting gains in efficiency. 
• In developing the National Freight Strategic Plan, the Department of Trans-
portation should give appropriate weight to security considerations, particu-
larly in outlining strategies to improve freight intermodal connectivity.19
Recommendations for Industry
• Industry should prepare standards and methodologies to optimize both the 
security and efficiency of global trade practices related to port operations. 
• Risk management experts and standards development bodies should sup-
port the current effort sponsored by the Department of Transportation’s 
Maritime Administration to develop a Port Investment Toolkit.
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Develop a Public-Private “Playbook” for Resilient Trade Flows
Whether natural or man-made, catastrophic events have serious security and 
economic consequences. When ports and intermodal facilities suffer major 
damage, the direct costs borne by exporters/importers soon cascade throughout 
supply chains, and the effects reach well beyond bottom-line accounting. Com-
promises to the physical infrastructure supporting trade flows — as well as dis-
ruptions in their oversight mechanisms — increase risk in other areas, including 
smuggling of proliferation-sensitive items. 
To date, government and industry have had limited success in developing business 
resumption plans that identify clear, detailed roles and responsibilites.20 Among the 
challenges are the number of stakeholders involved throughout both government 
and industry, the sheer volume and speed of cargo throughput, and the many port-
to-port variations in governance and other local variables.
Credibly signaling to industry that there would be a serious attempt to bring 
greater clarity to post-disruption planning could well have the reinforcing effect 
of prompting greater industry engagement in the process, and thus better results. 
While the ability to recover more quickly from a major disruption would not 
reflect a “positive” incentive, it would indeed reflect legitimate value. It also 
would highlight the advantages of those ports having established and stress-test-
ed detailed business resumption plans.
Findings
• The challenges of coordinating the many public and private stakehold-
ers make emergency restoration of trade flows a critical area to innovate 
in public-private governance mechanisms in general, and market-based 
incentives in particular. Effective business resumption planning requires 
the complete participation of the individual port authorities, whose unique 
relationships with local port stakeholders are key to securing buy-in from 
shipping companies, masters and unions.
• Insurers have an important and often overlooked role in assessing the 
impact of an incident, limiting additional harm and providing immediate 
financial support to those affected.
Recommendations for Government
• In preparing incident-specific annexes to the National Response Framework, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should include clear 
guidance on roles and responsibilities for trade flow restoration in different 
emergency scenarios, both natural and man-made.21 As the coordinating 
agency for the Economic Recovery Support Function, the Department of 
Commerce should help formulate this guidance by soliciting input from rel-
evant industry stakeholders. FEMA and the Commerce Department should 
examine how the work on business resumption planning by the COAC and 
select industry partners could inform the incident annexes.
• FEMA’s National Business Emergency Operations Center should make 
government-industry coordination in emergency trade resumption a 
leading priority. To this end, the Center should leverage the relevant 
COAC-industry efforts to the extent possible. 
• The Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration should work 
with industry to update the Port Risk Management and Insurance Guide-
book and include a new section outlining best practices for trade resump-
tion after natural and man-made disruptions. 
Recommendations for Industry
Insurance providers, other maritime industry stakeholders and standards devel-
opment organizations should explore the viability of insurance and risk manage-
ment products benchmarked against certified competency in business continuity 
planning and operations.
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Extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act and Consider Future Changes
Because terrorism risk cannot be modeled reliably, insurers and reinsurers would 
not provide the industry-desired level of coverage without government back-
stopping. Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) to provide 
that backstop, but its authorization expires at the end of 2014.22 Overall, insurers 
can be efficient “financial first responders” to natural or man-made disasters. 
While they cannot quantify the threat of terrorism, they can provide policyhold-
ers guidance and incentives to reduce other elements of risk before an event. 
Fully Implement The International Trade Data System
Across the US government, 47 agencies have some role in imports or exports.23 
The varied technology platforms, data requirements and associated processes 
seen across these agencies have caused major inefficiencies for both government 
and industry. The International Trade Data System (ITDS), under develop-
ment for years, is intended to remedy these issues by providing a “single win-
dow” — a federated clearinghouse through which trade entities can submit, and 
government agencies can collect, required data. ITDS would enhance export 
enforcement by providing greater visibility on export transaction data and bro-
kering information to the appropriate agencies for more efficient, effective and 
domain-specific risk assessment processes and analyses. It therefore would be an 
asset in preventing proliferation and mitigating other transnational crimes.
In February 2014, President Obama signed an executive order mandating full 
implementation of ITDS by December 2016 and codifying the role of the BIEC.24 
The BIEC brings together senior officials from relevant agencies to oversee ITDS 
implementation and help advance related border-management and trade-facilitation 
initiatives — those affecting US imports and US exports alike. The February 2014 
directive also mandates the BIEC to engage with industry and other non-govern-
mental entities on ideas that can “improve supply chain management processes, with 
the goal of promoting economic competitiveness through enhanced trade facilitation 
and enforcement.” To that end, the BIEC has established an External Engagement 
Committee as a dedicated mechanism for stakeholder dialogues.
Findings
Full and effective implementation of ITDS would significantly increase efficien-
cy and effectiveness, without affecting existing agency systems for trade data. 
ITDS would enable both government and industry to leverage a more compre-
hensive set of trade data to improve supply chain performance, reduce costs and 
harmonize risk assessment processes. The president’s February 2014 executive 
order presents an important opportunity for mutually beneficial public-private 
cooperation toward those objectives.
Recommendations for Government
• The White House should closely monitor implementation of the February 
2014 executive order — not only to ensure deployment of full and effective 
ITDS functionality on schedule, but also to drive progress on the broader 
mandates of the BIEC to engage industry and other stakeholders for modern-
ized trade and enforcement processes. Leveraging the BIEC for a more inte-
grated government approach to “trusted trader” regimes is one of the primary 
ways agencies can satisfy the executive order’s requirements in this regard.
• Before mandating that industry submit additional data elements in export/
import processes, CBP and other affected agencies should ensure such action 
“[M]arket-based incentives can promote significant changes in business 
practices and encourage the development of markets such as insurance 
for cyber, chemical, biological, or radiological risks.”
Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: 
Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, December 2013
Findings
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Program is a well-conceived effort to realign 
government and industry incentives so as to enhance both national security and 
economic competitiveness. However, the program does not specifically address 
coverage for catastrophic cyber events, as well as nuclear, chemical, biological and 
radiological (NCBR) events. Similar programs overseas mandate broader coverage.
Recommendations for Government
• Congress should extend TRIA for five years and direct the Treasury De-
partment’s Federal Insurance Office to immediately stand up a multi-stake-
holder task force to study possible TRIA program changes and report its 
findings, including recommended congressional action, within 18 months.
• Topics of the study should include: the potential expansion of offered or 
mandated coverage to include NCBR events and catastrophic cyber events, 
along with any additional risks that task force members deem worthy of 
inquiry; specific policy incentives that might be offered to TRIA policy-
holders that adopt specific security and resilience practices, with a compar-
ative evaluation of both incentives and policyholder practices; and potential 
increases in the loss threshold above the current level of $100 million.
Recommendations for Industry
The private sector and broader public should participate in the proposed task 
force, identifying how other market-based incentives might be introduced into 
the TRIA regime to enhance national security and promote development of the 
private market.
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would not undermine the executive order’s goal of “a reduction of unneces-
sary procedural requirements that add costs to both agencies and industry.”
Recommendations for Industry
Industry should continue its active participation in ITDS pilots and provide on-
going feedback to ensure ITDS remains a technology-neutral, interoperable and 
efficient platform for trade facilitation as well as data integration and sharing.
Conclusion
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Globalization of trade and commerce has changed the nature of governance 
itself. Top-down regulatory and enforcement tools cannot keep pace with con-
temporary technological change or with the speed and volume of global freight 
movement. Achieving genuine security amid a range of complex cross-border 
threats requires new partners and new models for engaging those partners. Per-
haps most important, it requires a deep and diverse set of industry partnerships. 
Our recommendations highlight a range of pragmatic, actionable steps toward this 
end. They would better align industry profitability and public security as mutually 
reinforcing goals in global business operations, principally through non-regulatory 
means. We do not presume that this approach offers a panacea. But it will be an 
essential part of any successful security strategy in the 21st century. 
Now is the time for decisive steps toward a new paradigm in public- 
private partnerships.
 
            CONCLUSION
ACHIEVING GENUINE SECURITY AMID 
A RANGE OF COMPLEX CROSS-BORDER THREATS 
REQUIRES NEW PARTNERS 
AND NEW MODELS FOR 
ENGAGING THOSE PARTNERS.
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A global economy has empowered criminals and terrorists 
on a global scale. Embedded across far-flung production, 
trade and investment networks, illicit trafficking in 
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down government controls. The challenges of preventing 
illicit transshipment and other misappropriations of 
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industry stakeholders for combating these threats through 
public-private partnerships that more effectively harness 
the power of decentralized, market-based incentives. 
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seven targeted proposals follow an 18-month Stimson 
collaboration with hundreds of industry partners 
spanning high-tech manufacturers and service providers, 
transport and logistics firms, and insurance providers. 
With the rise of a global marketplace, finding more 
innovative ways to leverage the resources, agility and 
expertise of the private sector is essential – and not 
just for “security,” narrowly understood. It will also 
go far in shaping the future of US global influence 
and leadership. The Task Force proposals connect that 
strategic imperative with pragmatic steps forward.
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